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Abstract 
The paper compares the broad outlines of decentralization taking place in India, 
dating from the last decade of the past century, with that of Indonesia in the first 
decades of the present one. When appropriate, material from China will be 
included in the essay. Of the usual subjects of political, administrative, and 
physical decentralization, the center of focus is on the generally acknowledged 
least successful in terms of reform, i.e. the civil administration. What the 
approach lacks in specific details concerning administrative decentralization in 
the respective republics, it makes up for in the emphasis on the key characteristics 
of each. Moreover, as public administration tends to reflect the individual 
countries‟ prevailing norms, such an approach tends to be influenced by a new 
range of literature and researchers whose views challenge accepted wisdom and 
inspire new lines of thinking on the subject. Justification for the approach comes 
from expectations that cross fertilization can inspire ideas for a „new paradigm 
and conceptual framework‟, ultimately leading to corrective action. The 
predominance of corruption/dysfunctional administrative behavior is explained by 
the fact that it draws upon an on-going project dealing with corruption in India 
and Indonesia, a joint venture of the Humanistic and Economics Faculties at Lund 
University. Represented by among others the author and Prof. Neelambar Hatti, 
the project has its origins in an earlier Lund-Parahyangan University project on 
Public Administration (1999-2006). 
 The paper opens by listing several of the more important contrasts 
between Indian, Indonesian, and Chinese decentralization. These include 
governmental structure, respective colonial heritage, and the focus of 
decentralization efforts. A short summary of the process of decentralization 
drawing upon the work of the Lund corruption project follows. The heart of the 
paper is the question of whether administrative decentralization furthers, hinders, 
or is neutral with regard to bureaucratic reform in theory and practice. Weighing 
up successes and failures leads to consideration of continued, if not higher, levels 
of corruption/dysfunctional behavior at all levels. Possible improvements are 
postulated, not surprisingly originating from the application of principles derived 
from New Public Management (NPM), with a couple of new wrinkles from India. 
These and other types of reform depend on general public engagement, which is 
conspicuous by its absence in Indonesia, especially in comparison with India‟s 
recent mass demonstrations, hunger-strikes, and high-level public condemnation 
of  (mega) public corruption. 
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Introduction 
Comparative method by its very nature is dependent upon a balance between similarities and 
dissimilarities of the objects in question. Gajah, gamelan, and the Great Wall have little in 
common. On the similarity side of the ledger India, India, and China are (or will be) BRIICs, 
i.e. emerging middle-class countries. They are all formally „republics‟. They also share the 
dubious status of low levels of transparency. While it is generally accepted that „the ways to 
the surau (prayer house) are many‟, there seem to be equally many ways to corruption or, 
more to the point, dysfunctional administration. Even more striking are the differences. 
Obviously there are great differences between India, Indonesia, and China with regard to size, 
culture(s) − including sharp contrasts in membership organizations as caste, tribe, and religion 
– as well as political groupings, language, and historical experiences. Those most relevant to 
current discussion in that they provide the framework for further discussion are would seem to 
be the structure of the national government, the basis of their laws and regulations, and the 
area singled out for emphasis in the decentralization process. 
 
 India is basically a union of federated states held together by the Republic‟s 
Constitution of 1947. The federal nature of the governmental system makes itself felt in the 
decentralization process, not the least in its terminology. „State‟ in the scholarly literature 
concerning India refers to the government of one of the twenty-eight states comprising the 
Republic. Implicit in the terminology is that sovereignty lies with the states, only being 
surrendered in degrees via agreement on the contents of the Constitution. The central 
government, i.e. the State writ large, is termed the „union‟, a usage harking back to British 
colonial terminology. In contrast, Indonesia remains a unitary state, as emphasized in the 
phrase „Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia‟ (NKRI) repeated in most laws and ordinances. 
Historical experience, namely Dutch attempts to fob off the independence movement in what 
was then Nederlands Oost Indië through the creation of a „Federated States of Indonesia‟, i.e. 
present day Indonesia minus New Guinea, under continued Dutch control made any talk of a 
federal system an anathema to all Indonesian leaders from the early days of independence 
down to the present. That much of Indonesia‟s decentralization process – actually drafted 
under President Hababie‟s term of office – took place during the presidency of Megawati 
Sukarnoputri meant that anything smacking of „federalizing‟, no matter how reasonable, was 
not politically correct. While in India the arena of decentralization is the state government as 
ordered by a top-down initiative of the Congres Party government which was agreed upon by 
the States approving the union level decision, in Indonesia initiative came from bottom-up 
popular demand channeled through the thirty-odd provinces and over four-hundred local units 
of municipalities (kota) and districts (kabupaten), which remain integrated in a political and 
fiscal hierarchy extending from the central government at Jakarta down to the lowest level. By 
way of ensuring that unity there is a tiered level of authority of laws and regulations. Any 
contents which conflict with ones at a higher level of governmental authority are 
automatically invalidated. The Constitution of 1945, with amendments most recently in 2004, 
remains the ultimate authority. In keeping with the concept of a unified state, the central 
government also retains its monopoly within the five key fields of defense, budget, internal 
security, customs and tolls, and taxation. 
 
 The second area in which one could expect great differences between the two countries 
is in the respective models for their laws and regulations. That the legal system of India and 
Indonesia derived from contrasting European legal principles should have produced 
distinctive systems. India‟s legal system is steeped in the Common Law tradition of England 
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and the English-speaking colonies of America and the Antipodes; Indonesia‟s derives from 
the Continental System of The Netherlands as strongly influenced by French practice; while 
China‟s came from the Socialist law tradition as the conscious application of the international 
communist manifesto.  
 
 In actual practice the differences played relatively little role. This was because the 
common denominator lay in the activities of European colonialism, namely exploitation of the 
countries‟ inhabitants for the good of the metropolis and/or the indigenous elite in cohort with 
international capitalism. Common Law case-led law forged by legal precedent via trial by 
one‟s peers was simply abandoned in the administrative practice of colonial India. District 
Officers, the linchpin of the colonial system, and other civil servants were given sweeping 
judicial authority for controlling the local population to an extent which would have been 
unthinkable (and probably illegal) in Great Britain. The converse situation developed in the 
Dutch East Indies. Characterized by set regulations enforced by an appropriately appointed 
official, Civil Law practice was undermined by the development of a de facto system of 
precedent. Successive generations of inexperienced Dutch officials newly-arrived in the 
colony looked naturally for guidance in their posts to their predecessors‟ actions. The latter 
were well documented by the archives of the Dutch East India Company or Nederlands Indië 
government. Lacking alternatives, they imitated their predecessors‟ manner of doing things. 
Even the adat, through successive handling in Dutch-dominated courts of law and minutely 
recorded in the Adatrech Bundel and other governmental gazettes, was subjected to a process 
of „statutization‟. Thus developed a sort of written precedent in which a decision in an earlier 
case to a great extent determined the outcome of a pending one. This contrasted with both the 
Continental legal system and traditional written legal traditions of the island (Hoadley, 2008). 
 
 As is the case throughout Asia, laws and regulations were supplanted by European 
standards via a process known as „legal transplants‟ (Legrand 2001, Watson 1991). Yet this is 
a side issue here. More important is that via Western legal and administrative principles 
imposed on Asian peoples, mainly by European civil and military personnel, the reigning 
administrative paradigm was irretrievably altered by the introduction of Weberian concepts of 
bureaucracy. Even though this was a relatively late innovation of the early 20
th
 century – thus 
proceeding the demise of the colonial system by only a few decades – the convention has 
haunted the governments ever since. Moreover, the principle of a rational and efficient 
administration governed by knowable rules for governmental service was easier to introduce 
in the newly-formed technical services than in the more conservative territorial administration 
led by District Officers, Residents, Controllers, etc. Technical services as health, education, 
communication, and finances, were not only new innovations in an Asian context staffed by 
trained personnel fresh from the metropolis. More important their results were measureable, 
thus quantifiable and comparable over time and place. In any event, those staffing the 
technical services did not necessarily spend their entire careers in the colony. This made them 
more open to keeping abreast of administrative developments in the metropolis where the 
instruments and esprit de corps of Weberian bureaucracy as servants of the public were 
becoming firmly entrenched. In contrast, the territorial administration in the colonies tended 
to be more flexible in accommodating local norms, which were pre- (or anti-) Weberian. Here 
it should be pointed out that nearly half the Indian colony was comprised of „native states‟ in 
which the British raj had on paper only nominal influence. Acceding to local practices, which 
could be profitable for the colonial civil servant, was not uncommon. On Java the 
Binnenlandsch Bestuur (BB) was known to be riddled with irregularities in its budget (note: 
stealing from the Mosque funds). More telling, was the official policy of the Dutch that in 
order to ensure loyalty the local bureaucratic elite, the priyayi were allowed exploitive 
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practices on the colony‟s subject sanctioned by neither local tradition nor Dutch law. In short, 
there was a built in element of corruption in the colony‟s territorial administration.  
 
 A final element with regard to the introduction of Weberian ideals was what Das (2006) 
has called an administrative esprit d‟corps. Although a so-called „soft‟ element, it played an 
important role in propagating the ideal of a neutral administration in which concern for and 
loyalty to the public weal took priority over private interests. In neither India nor Indonesia 
was this element passed on to post-colonial governments, or for that matter in China. This is 
partly explained by the fact that while the European bureaucrats of the Indian Civil Service 
(ICS) or Nederlands Indië‟s Binnenlands Bestuur (BB) were dominated by „old boyo‟ ties of 
schools (Oxbridge or Delft), class preferences, and perhaps most of all racial prejudice. For 
obvious reasons this was lacking among the Indians and Indonesians who took over the task 
of administering the new nations. While the upwardly mobile Indian, Indonesian, or Chinese 
could acquire the prerequisites of education and class, in fact many did, they remained, if you 
will excuse the expression, in the colonial jargon „natives‟. It can be argued that part of the 
élan of the colonial service rested on a „we‟ feeling of being called to guide the locals in order 
that they could aspire to European standards of civilization. No matter what the individually 
acquired merits or inherited status and position, locals were either only partially or not at all 
acceptable in the higher orders of the colonial administration. This meant that the political and 
economic transition from colony to independent nation entailed a radical alteration in the 
character of the bureaucracy. While the abstract Weberian ideals continued to be taught, the 
more practical demands of caste, class, and other membership groups quickly took precedent. 
These could be fulfilled mainly through alliance with political power vis à vis political parties. 
In Indonesia the break was particularly strong as the only local group with hands-on 
administrative experience, the priyayi, were suspect in the eyes of the independence 
movement due to their lack of enthusiasm for the struggle against the Dutch to whose position 
they often aspired. Although the bookish ideal remained the practical means of identification 
and mutual reinforcement disappeared, leaving the new bureaucracies in India and Indonesia 
highly politicized at an early period in the nations‟ history. 
 
 The focus of decentralization, the third feature named above, most definitely separated 
the Indian decentralization movement from that of Indonesia and China. For India, the 
panchayat was the ideal, the „village republics‟ so admired by British apologizers as Duff 
since the middle of the 19
th
 century. The name panchayat derived from earlier councils of five 
wise men, although they were more associated with negotiations over caste and sub-caste 
conflicts than day-to-day civil administration. Their reputation as extending back to the 
shadows of the sub-content‟s pre-history was a plus factor in emphasizing continuity with a 
pre-colonial past. The modern-day panchayat at district, taluk, and village level were, in fact, 
created in order to fulfill the India‟s goals of development and reduction of inequalities within 
a democratic framework. India chose to create semi-traditional institutions with a historical 
reputation as the main instrument of decentralization. These were hived off the state 
(province) area of power at the behest of the union government, in sum making a five-tiered 
governmental structure of union (state), state (province), and the three panchayat institutions 
at district, taluk, and village level, plus the equivalent municipality panchayat.  
 
 On paper at least, the Indonesian decentralization process was less radical. The unitary 
structure of the state as defined in the Constitution of 1945 (Art 1.1) was retained; its function 
modified by laws promulgated by Parliament (DPR). Through Law 22/1999 political 
autonomy was granted to the provinces and regional government in the form of districts 
(kebupaten) and municipalities (kota). Each would have its directly elected legislative and 
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executive branches in which the powers until then exercised by the central government were 
transferred to the provincial and local levels. This is, of course, with the exception of the five 
key areas named earlier. A second law (Law 24/1999) transferred a fixed percentage of the 
funds acquired locally (sale of natural resources, taxes, etc) which would henceforth remain in 
the unit to finance its activities. As a result, the local „decentralized‟ governmental units were 
freed from financial limitations stemming from being allotted only those funds seen a 
necessary by the central Jakarta government, almost by definition too little. In short, India 
decentralized via neo-traditional institutions of the panchayat which further emphasized its 
basically federalized system; Indonesia reformed its authoritarian, centralized system within 
the framework of a unitary state, now decentralized and democratized to a high degree. 
 
Administrative Decentralization 
 „Decentralization‟, which has been undertaken by a host of developing nations (note), 
during the last decades, is commonly differentiated into political, administrative, and fiscal 
decentralization.  With a decade or so of experience with them the results can be summarized 
roughly in Table 1 as the following. 
 
Table 1. Administrative decentralization: comparison between India and Indonesia 
 Political Administrative Fiscal 
India Extension of 
democracy    
less successful: 
dominated by ICS  
not successful or non-
functional 
Indonesia From authoritarian 
rule  to democracy  
transfers from 
centre to  
regional/local 
government  
personnel and 
salaries  
successful: done 
via set allotments  
 
  
 While all three countries get high marks for political decentralization via devolution, it 
is Indonesia which has changed most. Over three decades of authoritarian rule have been 
transformed to the present system of direct elections for virtually all political positions at all 
levels of government. There remain, however, constraints to a more thorough democratization 
process. Perhaps the most obvious one is the requirement that all local political parties must 
be part of national ones. This hinders local initiatives aimed at realizing popular local goals. 
Also by retaining the power of political parties at the national center it fosters corruption; all 
would be candidates must come to terms with the party bureaucracy, i.e. pay for the right to 
campaign in that party‟s colors. Also on the positive side Indonesia‟s efforts in specifically 
devolution funds from the centre to provincial and local governments has given those levels 
the wherewithal to act autonomously in response to local demands. Where the countries show 
less than satisfactory results are in the area of public administration dominated by a central, 
self-perpetuating bureaucracy whose reluctance to lose their grip is as understandable as it is 
regrettable. 
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 One hastens to add that the latter is not necessarily a failing of the decentralization 
project. There are structural and conceptual differences in administrative decentralization, 
which distinguish it from political and fiscal decentralization. In the nature of things each 
government has a real or ideal set of nationally imposed standards. While India‟s civil 
servants may differ from their Indonesian or Chinese counterparts, it would never do to have 
twenty-eight different types of administrative behavior depending upon the state or for that 
matter forty-three in the Indonesian case and so on. The respective constitutions, backed by 
the laws of the union or central government, demand a degree of conformity in order to retain 
their legitimacy. This limits the scope of decentralization in the form of devolution, 
delegation, or to some extent even of privatization in comparison to the spheres of public 
politics or economics. Local politics in Aceh – which alone are allowed to remain unaffiliated 
with national ones – or Iran Jaya obviously differ in terms of content, priorities, and style. A 
similar variation in administration would not be compatible with the NKRI unitary state. To 
the demands of reasonable degrees of national standardization comes the almost defining 
characteristic of bureaucracy, namely longevity and continuity. Political and fiscal systems 
come and go as called forth by popular will, private interests, or the tenor of the times; 
bureaucracy is here to stay. Not only does it enjoy considerable powers granted by its 
principles but also it tends to accumulate more over time. Thus even incremental gains of 
power over time without periodic review and reform demanded by their principles – which is 
rarely forthcoming – results in an accumulation of powers over and above those originally 
bequeathed (example of FBI‟s J. Edgar Hoover). Both features limit administrative 
decentralization to (marginal) de-concentration rather than the more sweeping ones of 
devolution, delegation, or privatization.  
 
Decentralization in India 
 
The following section cites Hatti‟s summary of India‟s decentralization process. 
 
... Soon after independence in 1947, the political leaders realized that given the problems 
of hunger, malnutrition, unemployment, gender inequality and so on, India needed a 
micro-level institutional arrangement to encourage popular participation.
3
 The basic 
idea was to create a system known as „four-pillar state, resting on the foundation of 
power sharing between the centre, state, district and village, thus opting for a top-down 
and gradual decentralization.
4
 
 
 ...At the time of framing the Constitution, Article 40
5
 was inserted into Part IV, known as 
the Directive Principles of the State Policy, to make provision for the creation of village 
panchayats (Mathur 1999, Manor 1999). As this was not mandatory, both the central 
government and the state governments choose to ignore it. 
 
                                                          
3 The initial impulse to develop the micro-level institution of panchayat came from Mahatma Gandhi. During India‟s struggle 
for freedom, he had argued for a system of governance under which village panchayats would discharge those functions as 
could realistically be discharged at the village level, leaving the rest to the institutions of the state. 
4 The degree of decentralization or local autonomy depends on the Constitutional assignment and practices and conventions 
developed over the years. The basic framework of intergovernmental relationships in Indian federation is given by the 
Constitutional assignment of functions and sources of finance. The seventh schedule to the Constitution of India specifies the 
Union list - the exclusive domain of the Central government, the State list- the exclusive domain of the State governments, 
and the Concurrent list where both levels have joint jurisdiction. (Kalirajan and Otsuka 2010, 5. See also Kumar 2006). 
5 Article 40 relates to the organization of village panchayats. It states, “The State shall take steps to organise village 
panchayats and endow them with such powers as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government”. 
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 In 1952, Community Development Programme (CDP) came into existence as a 
part of the central government policy to encourage people‟s participation in local 
development. However, with the failure of this policy in 1950s, the idea of constituting 
representative institutions at the level of village was keenly felt. In 1956, the government 
appointed a committee to review the programme and suggested a working institutional 
arrangement. The committee pointed out that one reason for the failure of the panchayats 
was the absence of an organic link between different levels and suggested restructuring 
the old programme as a three-tier system with a view to ensuring the people‟s 
involvement in development programmes.
6
 The Committee also argued, “So long as we 
do not discover or create a representative and democratic institution /…/ invest it with 
adequate power and assign it appropriate finances, we will never be able to evoke local 
interest and excite local initiative in the field of development” (Balwant Rai Mehta 
Committee Report 1957:5). The committee‟s suggestion to establish three-tier panchayats 
was accepted by the government and came to be known as Panchayati Raj Institution 
(PRI). Since this committee did not make provisions for fiscal decentralization, a new 
committee was constituted in 1963 to look into panchayat finances (K.Santhanam 
Committee 1963). Its key recommendations included powers to levy a special tax on land 
revenues and homes, and consolidation of all grants at the state level and devolution to 
PRIs. However, these recommendations were not fully implemented due to lack of 
political will. By the early 1970s, the institution stagnated and gradually declined in 
almost all the states due to inadequate devolution of powers, dominant role of vested 
interests and interference by officials. Thus, the original idea of creating a „four-pillar 
state‟ remained an elusive dream.  
 In 1978 yet another committee was appointed to examine measures to revive 
and strengthen PRIs (The Ashok Mehta Committee 1978).
7
 The first official 
recommendation made was to include panchayats in the Constitution. This shifted the 
thrust from the panchayat as a development organization to the panchayat as a political 
institution. Recommendations of the Ashok Mehta Committee were: (i) The district 
should be the key administrative unit for planning, coordination and resource allocation, 
and the management of rural and urban continuum, (ii) The PRIs should be a two-tier 
system, with the mandal panchayat (block/taluka) at the base and the zilla parishad 
(district) at the top, (iii) There should be population-based representation of the 
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) in the election to PRIs, (iv) There 
should be participation of political parties in elections and (v) There should be financial 
devolution consistent with the devolution of developmental functions to the district level. 
 Several Indian states – notably West Bengal, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh – 
welcomed the idea and made efforts to encourage the growth and empowerment of the 
PRIs. Yet the support to these second generation panchayats (in contrast to the first 
generation panchayats that came in the wake of the 1959 Report) did not last long, except 
in West Bengal (Ghosh and Kumar 2003). The pace of panchayat empowerment was 
slow, again due to lack of political interest in devolving power to local governments and 
also the PRIs remained constitutionally unrecognised. 
                                                          
6 The three tiers were village, block/taluka and district panchayats. 
7 Looking into the causes of decline of the first generation panchayats, the Committee identified two factors: bureaucratic 
resistance to the idea of transfer of power to grass root institutions, and the unwillingness of politicians at the state and central 
levels to allow the emergence of parallel centres of power. Lack of political will to devolve still remains the problem in many 
states. (See, Kalirajan and Otsuka, Kumar, Ibid). 
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 In late 1991, the then government introduced the constitutional amendment bills 
to enshrine the panchayats and urban municipalities in the Indian Constitution and the 
amendments, 73
rd
 (panchayats) and 74
th
 (municipalities), came into force in 1993.
8
 The 
amendments made a sea change in the status of the panchayats because the Constitution 
made it mandatory for all the states to set-up three-tier panchayats and to hold direct 
elections to all the tiers at the regular interval of five years and imposed a political 
uniformity on the structure and workings of the third tier. They provided for independent 
election commissions to systemize and supervise elections of local village councils 
(panchayats). These amendments also mandated that the panchayats be given more fiscal 
authority and political power. They introduced village assemblies (gram sabhas)
9
 to be 
held at regular intervals throughout the year. These are open meetings which anyone in 
the village is free to attend in order to discuss budgets, development plans, the selection 
of beneficiaries, and to interrogate village panchayat and local administrative officials on 
any issue. Another important change was the introduction of reservation for Scheduled 
Castes and Tribes and women (a third of all seats in the panchayat and all presidencies on 
a rotating basis) for seats on panchayats, including the position of the panchayat president 
(pradhan or sarpanch)
10
. 
 
 
Graph 1. Structure of Multilevel Government in India
11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Government of India, The Constitution Seventy-Third Amendment Act 1992, New Delhi, 1993. 
9 Gram Sabha was to be comprised of all adults over 18 years of age and residing within the boundaries of the village 
panchayat.  
10
 Vijayendra Rao, August 2005, p.18 
11
 Source: Rao, 2001. 
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Indonesian Decentralization as Regional Autonomy 
 Given the nature of the audience, only the outlines of Indonesian decentralization need 
be cited here. The following is a quote from the author‟s Western Forms v Indonesian Norms 
(Yogyakarta 2006, 84-6). 
 
 Without fear of exaggeration one can say that the issue of decentralization/ 
regional autonomy (otonomi daerah or otda) has dominated the century. Motivation 
for what by international standards has been an impressive movement towards 
decentralization stems from several interrelated concerns of the post Orde Baru 
period. These can be summarized under the headings defense, development, and 
democracy. One of the immediate motivations for decentralization was 
apprehension lest disaffected regions demand extreme forms of local autonomy 
amounting to independence. Actually taken by Timor Leste and threatened by 
Papua and Aceh, such runs counter to the idea of a unified nation as stated by Art. 1 
of the Constitution and reiterated the Pancasila, as well as by the often-repeated 
acronym NKRI (Negara Kesatuan Republic Indonesia, the unified state of the 
Republic of Indonesia). Its increased use in official terminology is most likely a 
result of serious discussion of the possibility of a federated state during the 
presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid in among others Kompas (see St. Sularto dan T. 
Jakob Koekerits 1999). Decentralization through regional autonomy was seen as an 
instrument for defending the Republic‟s unity. Decentralization/ otda is also seen as 
the instrument for kick-starting the economic development so grievously 
interrupted by the Asian crisis of 1997-98. The precise linkage is not entirely 
obvious. One assumes that greater power in the hands of the regions, which know 
their own strengths and needs, facilitates economic growth. Through better 
utilization of indigenous and foreign funds decentralization is thought to be able to 
spread wealth more evenly throughout the Republic, thus providing development 
through growth. A part of this development would bring about better service 
provided the public. Here it seems clear that the shorter the path of services 
provided to the public the better. In that case more service should reach the stake 
holders. And finally by bringing the government closer to the public 
decentralization brings about a more democratic order. Yet it remains unclear 
whether the increased accountability and transparency is a precondition or result of 
the decentralization process. An implicit fourth factor exists in the form of 
expectations that decentralization will help to check the wide-spread corruption 
characteristic of Indonesia, one which threatens both development and democracy. 
Development is threatened due by channeling of public resources to private benefit, 
which makes Indonesia an unattractive place for direct foreign investment, 
international credit, and direct aid. Democracy is threatened due to granting special 
privileges based on influence of wealth, status, or both. 
 
 To date one can observe that reformasi is by and large a problem of the center rather 
than the regions, let alone the village (desa) or hamlet (kampong). Thus one of the more 
important aspects of reform aspirations turns on re-defining relations existing between the 
pusat (national government) and the regions (daerah). Consequently a short sketch of the 
decentralization process in the post Suharto period provides the necessary background for 
subsequent discussion of new developments in public administration. New Order political 
rhetoric on the issue of decentralization in point of fact concealed a highly centralized, 
hierarchical governmental organization. Even though on paper a proponent of regional 
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autonomy, such was realized only with the New Order‟s demise in May 1998 and 
promulgation the following year of Law No. 22 on Regional Governance and No. 25 on Fiscal 
Balance Between the Center and the Regions. Crucial here was revision of the provisions of 
Law No. 5/1974 which until then had set the Principles of Regional Government. Decree No. 
XV/MPR/1998 passed by an extra-ordinary session of the Peoples‟ Consultative Assembly set 
in motion the process of revision. As a result of that decision, the Ministry of Home Affairs 
with the council of senior civil servants, academics, and advisors drafted the basis of what 
would become of Law No. 22/1999. A parallel process was started by the Ministry of Finance 
aimed at reforming intergovernmental finance, one that resulted in a draft for Law No. 
25/1999. Both were subsequently approved by the DPR in May 1999, with the proviso that the 
new decentralization organization would come into effect in May 2001. The date was 
subsequently moved up to 1 January 2001 so that its beginning would coincide with the new 
fiscal year. 
 
Law No. 22/1999 
 
 Law No. 22/1999 provided for devolution of a wide range of public service functions 
to the regions. Elected regional councils (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) were 
strengthened and received wide-ranging powers to supervise and control the regional 
administration. The primary winners were kabupaten and kota which were given considerable 
autonomy. According to §7.1, the daerah has responsibility for all governmental matters 
except in the areas of foreign affairs, defense and security, justice, monetary and fiscal affairs, 
religion and other matters. The latter consisted of a large number of functions, including 
„macro-level planning, fiscal equalization, public administration, economic institutions, 
human resource development, natural resource utilization, strategic technologies, 
conservation, and national standardization‟ (§ 7.2). Responsibilities specifically entrusted to 
the daerah included public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, transport, 
industry and trade, investment, environment, land matters, co-operatives and manpower (§ 
11), as well as planning, financing, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and 
maintenance (Elucidation § 8). In cases where daerah governments are not able to handle 
these tasks they can be transferred back to the provinces. In addition the daerah could be 
given additional tasks as co-administrator of specified functions, on the condition that these be 
accompanied by the means to carrying them out in the form of  funds, infrastructure, and staff 
(§ 13.1). In short, daerah were given control over their finances, civil services, and 
organizational set-up. 
 
 The looser in the decentralization of 1999 was the provinces. Daerah regional 
autonomy was defined as „wide‟ (luas), that of the provinces as „limited‟ (terbatas). 
Provincial governors continued in the double function as head of an autonomous region 
(kepala daerah otonom) and as representative of the central government under powers 
delegated by the President via the Ministry of Home Affairs. According to § 9, the main 
functions of the provinces are intra-regional co-ordination involving kota and kebupaten, as 
well as regional macro-planning, human resource development and research, management of 
regional ports, environmental protection, promotion of trade and tourism, pest 
control/quarantine, and spatial planning. Moreover the kabupaten/kota level was removed 
from the chain of command which under the Orde Baru government ran from the president 
through the provincial governor to the village level. Election of bupati and walikota no longer 
required the clearance from higher levels of government, being  accountable only to their 
respective local councils. And finally, Law No. 22/1999 drew a clearer distinction between 
the DPRD as local legislative body and the administration as the executive branch. 
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 The deconcentrated agencies of the pusat located in the regions were merged with the 
respective daerah agencies. Staff and assets were transferred to the regions, with the 
exceptions of the five areas of responsibility monopolized by the central government 
mentioned above. Sub-districts (kecamatan) became deconcentrated units of the local 
government. Village level councils and village chiefs are directly elected and their institutions 
can be fashioned in accordance with local traditions (adat) and needs. Basic to this 
decentralization is fiscal responsibility; deconcentration must be supported by sufficient 
funding from the central government (§ 8.2). This was to ensure that the central government 
did not transfer so-called „unfunded mandates‟ to the local level. More important, income 
must be balanced with expenses in the local budget (Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Daerah, 
APBD). Although regions may borrow from national capital markets, borrowing from abroad 
requires prior approval by the central government. Interregional cooperation is encouraged by 
§ 87. In a reversal of the Orde Baru top down manner of government, under decentralization 
supervision and development (pengawasan, pembinaan) by the pusat are to „facilitate‟, as 
opposed to control, the  activities and capacities of regional governments (§ 112). The main 
exception here is provided by Art. 114, which lays down the central government‟s authority to 
nullify decisions, regulations or laws passed by local government which are in conflict with 
„general interests‟ (kepentingan umum) and national laws (§§ 2-3). It also contains the time 
limits for those decisions and appeal mechanisms open for regional governments to challenge 
them. 
 
Law No. 25 /1999 
  
 Law No. 25/1999 on „Fiscal Balance between the Center and the Regions‟ 
complements the administrative provisions of Law No. 22. Its intention is to raise regional 
economic capabilities. This includes creating a system of finance which is „just, proportional, 
rational, transparent, participatory, accountable and provides certainty‟. It also aims at 
reflecting the division of functions between levels of government and reducing regional 
funding gaps. The major income of regional governments (Pendapatan Asli Daerah, PAD) is 
local taxes, local charges and fees, and revenue from local enterprises. Additional sources of 
revenue are equalization funds (dana perimbangan), borrowing and special imposts. One of 
the latter is the equalization fund consisting of the regional share of the property tax (PBB) 
and property transfer tax (BPHTB), another the regional share of natural resources revenue 
(bagi hasil) of the general grant (Dana Alokasi Umum, DAU), and a third specific grants 
(Dana Alokasi Khusus, DAK). Law No. 25/1999 also specifies the formula for sharing such 
taxes and revenue from natural resources. The primary instrument for this is provided by the 
central government budget (APBN). A floor of 25% of domestic revenues is earmarked for 
the equalization fund; 22.5% to be transferred to the local level and 2.5% to the provincial 
level. Under the Regional Autonomy Advisory Council (Dewan Pertimbangan Otonomi 
Daerah,  DPOD), of which the Minister of Finance is vice-chairman, a grants administration 
is established to advise the DPOD on grants formula and fiscal equalization issues. Both laws 
need a multitude of implementing regulations in order to become fully operational.  
 
Law No. 32/2004 
  
 Possibly as a result of the speed with which they were passed, a list of issues resulted, 
counseling revision of the two laws of 1999. These include 1) the unclear distribution of 
functions between levels of government, 2) the ineffective system of supervision of regional 
governments by the central government and the lack of clear responsibilities of the provinces, 
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3) the failure of the current intergovernmental fiscal system to ensure equalization between 
resource-rich and resource-poor regions and a mismatch between the assignment of 
expenditures and the assignment of revenues, 4) the lack of policy coordination with sectoral 
laws and regulations, leading to contradictory regulations for instance in the forestry and in 
the mining sector, 5) the strong role of money politics in the election of Head of Regions 
(Kepala Daerah) by the regional councils (DPRD), 6) the unsatisfactory accountability 
mechanism which focuses on the annual report of the Head of Region to the council, 7) the 
lack of capacity at the regional level to fully implement the new decentralization framework, 
and 8) lack of programs of the central government to support capacity building in the regions. 
A complete analysis of Law No. 32 and its complement concerning daerah finances, Law No. 
33, is premature at this juncture. In any event, its contents contain only minor changes. 
Bureaucratic/Administrative Reform? 
 Implicit expectations that decentralization automatically leads to administrative reform 
tends to overlook the essential character of bureaucracy. In contrast to politics and economics, 
which maintain neutrality, administration in its alter ego of bureaucracy has definite negative 
tones. Under the heading of „Bureaucratic Behaviour‟, Das (1998, 169ff) quotes Jain and 
Dwiveli (1989, 295) to observe that 
The Indian civil service suffers from an obsession with the binding and inflexible 
authority of departmental decisions, precedents, arrangements, or forms 
regardless of how badly or with what injustice they may work in individual cases. 
Additionally, the civil service suffers from a manina for regulations and formal 
procedures, a preoccupation with activities of the particular units of 
administration and an inablility to consider the government as a whole. 
This,  
…conforms to what Michel Crozier calls „bureaucratic behaviour‟; the normal 
association what people have with the „vulgar and frequent sense of the word 
„bureaucratic‟, which Crozier explains, „evokes the slowness, the ponderousness, 
the routine, the complication of procedures, and the maladapted responses of 
“bureaucratic” organizations to the needs which they should satisfy, and the 
frustrations with their members, clients, or subjects consequently endure‟ 
(Crozier 1964, 3 cited in Das 1998, 170). 
 
 The main characteristics of administration or bureaucracy are continuity, longevity, and 
conservatism. Translated into policy, continuity refers to the senatorial function contributing 
to social/governmental stability at the price of flexibility, longevity to the predominance of 
seniority over performance in determining civil servants‟ position and rewards, and 
conservatism to the application of rules or accepted ways of doing things derived external to 
the administration in question. An administration by nature is „rule bound‟ bringing it into 
close alliance with law, a point to which we shall return. The danger lies in a time gap, i.e. 
behavior based upon out-of-date norms. A possibly overstated illustration is one critic‟s 
comment that the present Greece economic crisis comes from its government behaving as if 
they were still under the Ottoman Sultanate. Be that as it may, one can agree that politics and 
economics are in comparison more volatile and changeable; they articulate closely with the 
political will, as for example whether decentralization is „in‟, or demands of the market, 
whose violent swings are seldom predictable but have great impact on society.  
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 Innate administrative conservatism makes it natural for almost every writer on Indian 
administrative concepts open by tracing the origins of the present ISA from the colonial ICS, 
if not the Moghuls or earlier. The author is likewise guilty of such tendencies in explaining 
Indonesian public administration or law through reference to the past as well as the present 
(2006, 2008). More than an exercise in historical nostalgia, the heritage can still be discerned 
in the administrative structure of both countries, to which one is tempted to add the even older 
Confucian tradition for the Peoples‟ Republic of China. Even the most jaded historian would 
not be so rash as to suggest history holds the key to contemporaneous economics or politics. 
Yet the inherent conservatism of administrative behavior makes change, here through 
decentralization efforts, almost a conflict in terms, especially in the implications of 
„bureaucracy‟ in the pejorative sense. But where does this leave us in possibilities of 
administrative reform? Let‟s just say that it provides a challenge, a great one at that. But lest 
one become disheartened over the difficulties to institute tangible reforms, it should be 
remembered that challenges are made to be overcome.  
 
Decentralization = Reform? 
 
 Reduced to its essentials, the question is whether the administrative decentralization 
experienced by India, Indonesia or any of the other decentralization projects during the past 
decades is positive, negative, or neutral vis á vis administrative reform. Does it contribute to 
progress toward, failure of, or is neutral with regard to such basic governmental reform. For 
convenience sake it is easiest to start with the question of decentralization versus reform in 
general before tackling the more specific issue with regard to administrative reform. Despite 
the fact that „better public service‟ or the like is most often baked into the arguments for 
decentralization – along with decreasing inequalities and fostering development (India) and 
bringing about democracy (Indonesia) – the literature on the subject is less sanguine about the 
results. In theory, so the argument goes, bringing administration closer to the public it is 
supposed to serve should bring about positive results in terms of greater accountability, ease 
of local initiatives, and a degree of openness to social control. After all, the political, 
administrative, and economic personnel are part of the local community where they live and 
act. Thus decentralization should make them more receptive to pressures to conform to 
society‟s norms, i.e. not be corrupt or exploit the common weal or fellow citizens, than within 
the more anomalous central bureaucratic structure. Yet such expectation are hard to 
document. 
 
 The problem of establishing a definitive positive connection between decentralization 
and administrative reform or, expressed in negative terms, between decentralization and 
corruption is illustrated by, among others, the exposition of Fisman and Gatti. In 
„Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries‟ (2002, 325-45) they note the 
„ambiguous predictions about this relationship‟, namely decentralization of governmental 
activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties, which have „…remained little 
studied by empiricists.‟ (p. 325).  The paper examines the issue by employing a number of 
sophisticated indices of corruption, including International Country Risk Guide, Transparency 
International, and Business International/EIU, as well as other indices of competitiveness, 
civil liberties, schooling, population & government size, legal origins, etc. These are plotted 
against a measure of the degree of decentralization, i.e. IMF‟s Government Finance Statistics 
(GFS) (341-3). Through the information thus collated, they come to the conclusion that at 
least in the case of fiscal decentralization there is a positive correlation between lower levels 
of corruption and decentralization. Even so, the argument is hedged with a number of 
uncertainties and unaccountable variables. In keeping with the general methodological 
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problem of translating „soft‟ data into mathematical scales, the most obvious problem is to 
judge whether the degree of „perception‟ of corruption tallies with the phenomenon in reality, 
a problem shared by virtually all measures social/economic indicators. The fact that there 
seems no realistic alternative should not bring about too much of a „suspension of disbelief‟. 
A recent survey of citizen perception of the ease of launching a new enterprise reveals an 
almost one-to-one correlation with high levels of corruption. A seductive, if erroneous, 
interpretation might be that business should look to the most corrupt countries for ease of 
investment! Moreover, as the authors point out, the outcome many of the individual cases are 
dependent upon what type of decentralization has taken place, local circumstances, and other 
external factors. While it is not the intention to single out a particular study, it would seem to 
reflect the problems in establishing a causal connection between corruption (here an antonym 
to „good governance‟) and decentralization or the converse. 
 
 Antidotal evidence from specific cases tends to point in the opposite direction, namely 
that decentralization tends to lead to greater corruption rather than to less. Johnson (2003) 
quoting the World Bank‟s skepticism on the results of Indian decentralization, maintains that 
 
Using the conventional classification of „political, administrative and fiscal 
decenralisation,‟ tahe World Bank‟s three-volume study of Indian 
decentralisation (World Bank, 2000a; 2000b; 2000c) ranks India „among the best 
performers‟ internationally in terms of political decentralsation, but „close to the 
last‟ in terms of administrative decentralization. 
. . .  
The World Bank study goes on to argue that although Indian States and the Union 
government have been willing to recognize the Panchayats, to hold elections and 
to respect stipulations governing reservations for Scheduled Castes (SCs), 
Scheduled Tribes (STs) and women, they have been unwilling to vest them with 
sufficient „administrative control over significants or fiscal autonomy,‟ (World 
Bank, 2000a: xi). In most States, Panchayats have been handed a wide array of 
responsibilities without the necessary fiscal and administrative resources (19). 
 
 This has been primarily due to federal constraints, most noticeable the „resistant‟ 
bureaucracy (24-5) and, most important, „Elite capture‟ (28-31). The latter has also been 
emphasized by Das (1998, 2001) and others, who point to the fact that the Panchayat Raj 
Institution (PRI) has been captured by local caste, tribal, or political elites. It has thereby 
become another tool of illegal influence. This dates back to Congress Party rule and the 
actions of Mrs. Gandhi during the Emergency of 1970-73, only to be strengthened two 
decades later after the decentralization acts as amendments to the Indian Constitution 
mentioned above. 
 
 Despite the fact that in Indonesia fiscal decentralization has been more regulated and 
its membership groups are far less developed as alternative sources of loyalities, 
decentralization seems to have contributed more to corruption/dysfunctional governance than 
the reverse. Curiously enough, the Indian pattern seems to hold, although the „elite‟ of „elite 
capture‟ is more along the lines of ad hoc groups than standing semi-formal societal 
institutions. In short, „… the decentralization process had been effectively hijacked by 
predatory interests‟. Although the neo-institutionalist literature sees a decentralization leading 
to democracy through greater transparency, accountability, the enhancement of practices of 
good governance, the realities of the process are different.  
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Here decentalization has given rise to highly diffuse and decentralized corruption, 
rule by predatory local officials, the rise of money politics and the consolidation 
of political gangsterism (Vedi 2003, 16).   
 
The general tenor of the evidence, such that it is, argues against decentralization neutrality 
with regard to dysfunctional administrative behavior. While the theoretical and general 
literature claim a positive correlation between decentralization and good governance/ 
democracy, specific case studies tend to emphasize the negative correlation in the form of 
increased corruption. Due to Indonesia‟s experience in progressing out of authoritarian rule, a 
decentralization of corruption was almost inevitable. However the question remains as to 
whether there has been an increase of the quantity of corruption or merely redistribution of its 
practitioners and rewards.  
 
 
Gains and losses 
 
 Here it seems worthwhile to pause in order to summarize the balance between gains 
and losses of decentralization as seen in comparative perspectives. On the positive side of the 
ledger are the undeniable gains, mostly in progress towards real democratization. This has 
been especially noteworthy in Indonesia were direct and free elections now prevail at all 
levels of government. For India the decentralization acts of the 1990s seems to have increased 
democratic participation by scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and women. To this comes at 
least the great potential for better public service via the respective regional and local 
governing bodies. On the fiscal side, Indonesia seems to have performed better just because 
the acts initiating decentralization provide for funds for regional and local bodies as the where 
with all for the process to function more or less as planned. India in this respect seems caught 
up in tensions between State governments and the panchayats with regard to various sources 
of funding for the many development projects. And finally on the administrative side, India‟s 
conservative ISA has in the past decades functioned well as the heir of the British raj in 
holding the country together in times of crisis, man-made and natural (Das 1998). 
 
 As with much in this world, losses are more easily reckoned than gains. Given the 
structure of the state, the two that come most readily to mind prevail in Indonesia. First, 
unlimited decentralization could pave the way for extremes, possibly even threatening the 
continued existence of the NKRI. A couple of examples illustrate the, albeit unlikely, types of 
centrifugal forces at work. Surprisingly enough, the first concerns Bali. The island‟s relative 
prosperity and high employment attracts relatively large numbers of outsiders, mainly from 
neighboring East Java. However, local feelings run high that these „immigrants‟ not only take 
jobs away from locals but also their culture undercuts continued predominance of the Balinese 
majority. For obvious reasons the immigrants do not support with funds or voluntary work the 
myriad of local festivals and ceremonies. Yet moves to discriminate or restrict the activities 
and/or residence via local regulations, which are made possible by administrative 
decentralization, clash with the idea of Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia open to all 
citizens (see xxx). An even more unlikely scenario would be local regulations on the basis of 
religious prejudice, e.g. shamanism in Irian, Christianity in the Molukas, or Islam in, say, 
Aceh, discriminating against or requirements of dress or behavior deviating from national 
usage. Given too free a hand, such could even exacerbate regional and local differences, as for 
example the Outer islands versus Java, not seen since the days of PRRI of the 1950s. In other 
words, there is a constant need for a trade-off between center and periphery faced daily by 
decentralized governmental structures.  
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 The second danger is a more mundane administrative one, namely that of duplication 
of services. This is particularly the case if there is no effective coordination between national, 
regional, and local governments. Theoretically the problem can be illustrated by postulating 
that if each of Indonesia‟s 450-plus regional and local governments produced only one 
hundred laws, regulations, or ordinances per year, then the total sum of local enactments 
whose constitutionality has to be controlled by the Ministry of the Interior is at a minimum 
four to five thousand per year, i.e. some fifty thousand since the beginning of decentralization 
and growing. As such an additional work load is nearly impossible to fulfill in sufficient 
detail, there is a high possibility of deviations from the intention of the Constitution of 1945 
actually becoming de facto the law of the land at the regional or local level.  
 
Yet when all is said and done, it is the third feature which dominates the minus for 
decentralization, namely corruption. If our reasoning to date has been correct, and it is 
admittedly antidotal, then to political, administrative, and fiscal decentralization should be 
added dysfunctional administrative behavior more popularly known as corruption. Even if 
decentralization has improved administrative effectiveness, which no one argues, it would still 
have brought about the daunting prospects of now having over four-hundred fifty more or less 
autonomous units only loosely arranged in a governmental hierarchy in which to eradicate 
corruption.  
 
Mechanisms for Better Governance  
  
 If we turn from the abstract to the practical, what should we think about? As pointed 
out by many, the first step would be through implementation of more precise administrative 
laws (see Brietzke 2002). While the laws of the land, i.e. central, provincial, and local 
governmental regulations are plentiful and relatively specific, those regulating the conduct of 
members of the respective administrations are not. In both India and Indonesia what can be 
termed „job description‟ for respective office holders is far too discretionary. Despite India‟s 
Common law origins, the heritage of the colonial past has meant the building up of an 
administration aimed at controlling the population rather than serving it. In Indonesia the 
broad and unspecified Civil Law tradition expects statutory acts to be implemented by 
administrative directives which are sometimes almost always grant broad state 
 
…discretion, lacking in transparency and accountability. They seldom descend to 
the level of specificity needed to define particular tasks and require that they be 
performed (Brietzke 2002, 112). 
 
While the situation has improved during the last decade, the lack of this type of administrative 
law hinders bureaucratic effectiveness and efficiency in two major ways. First, the tasks and 
responsibilities of the official are not spelled out in sufficient detail to allow redress or 
disciplinary measures of behavior generally considered as inappropriate or at odds with 
minimal expectations, i.e. corruption. Perhaps even more damning, that official cannot be 
formally faulted for not doing anything. Thus putative action, even if the courts or superiors 
would condemn him, is powerless if they cannot show a breach of specific rules. Second, the 
lack of clarity in what each official is bound by law to carry out creates a situation in which 
coherence or consistency with regard to inter- and intrastate relations are conspicuous by their 
absence. This is especially true where an errand touches out two or more areas of competence, 
which they often do. 
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 The last point brings up another aspect, namely accountability in a more general 
manner. Das argues that the Indian bureaucracy relies on an age-old ex post facto budgetary 
audit. That is, after the period has passed one looks at the accomplishments and tries to see if 
they match up with the resources which had been granted. The underlying assumption is that 
mismatches or failures will be corrected in the next budgetary term. Yet this most often 
remains a point of belief when the next budget is approved, one based on the previous one 
with a few percentage additions. Hence there is little congruence between resources allotted 
from outside the administrative system and the work done, which in turn tends to lead to a 
Parkinson-ian finding activities to consume funds and functionaries available rather than 
being allotted resources calculated to cover the accomplishment of specific tasks. The picture 
could have been taken from almost anywhere in the Indonesian bureaucracy. 
 
New Public Management (NPM) 
 
 The solution would seem to be to take a chapter from the New Public Management 
(NPM), which has been functioning for decades in, say, New Zealand and Sweden. Whatever 
the model, and they are not limited to these two examples, the idea in this specific case would 
be to introduce ex ante budgetary procedures. By this is meant that before the funds are 
allocated the projected actions and necessary resources are presented from appraisal. Like the 
issue with more specific job descriptions, it allows a more precise evaluation of performance 
of the organization and its members, which in turn should provide the basis for rewards and 
punishments. This is, of course, only one of the many ideas for greater administrative 
efficiency and effectiveness associated by the NPM concepts. From the 1970 onwards under 
the influence of the Thatcher and Reagan the basic premises of the welfare state began to be 
questioned. A paradigm shift occurred in which the new model was the „entrepreneurial 
government‟. This can be said to provide the cornerstone of the subsequent NPM. 
 
Elements 
 
 New Public Management is not about specific policies or even a set of techniques, 
although it includes both. It is better described as a package aimed at improving public 
administration through utilization of concepts taken from the private sector. Although the 
exact nature of what is included or not included in New Public Management has yet to be 
determined, a somewhat abstract definition includes, 
 
...deregulation of line management; conversion of civil service departments into 
free-standing agencies or enterprises; performance-based accountability, 
particularly through contracts; and competitive mechanisms such as contracting-
out and internal markets (Aucoin 1993, Hood 1991). Various authors also include 
privatization and downsizing as part of the package (Ingraham 1996; Minouque 
1998) (from Polidano 1999). 
 
A more recent and practical summary of its basic features would include the following.  
  
 - hands-on, entrepreneurial management,  not traditional bureaucratic  forms  
  -.explicit standards and measures of performance 
  - emphasis on output controls 
  - importance of disaggregation and decentralization of public services 
  - competition in the provision of public services 
  - stress on private sector styles of management 
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  - promotion of discipline and parsimony in resource allocation, and 
  - separation of political decision-making from the direct management of public  
  services (Osborne and McLaughlin 2002, 9-10). 
 
 The heart of the concepts lies in the middle three points of disaggregation or 
decentralization, competition, and privatization of public services. These give the package 
its characteristic features, which have combined with the world-wide moves toward 
decentralization to the extent of being almost inseparable. They are used in the following 
discussion to provide the core of the new approach to public administration based on ideas 
deriving from the school of thought identified as New Public Management. More to the 
point here, the combination decentralization/privatization and NPM has been embraced 
wholeheartedly by the donor nations contributing to international funds.  
 
A debate has also raged both to the extent that it [NPM] is a globally convergent 
or a more nationally specific (an Anglo-American) phenomenon (Kickert 1997) 
and to whether its apparent prevalence is due to its universal applicability or its 
adoption and promulgation by such international bodies as the World Bank and 
IMF as a universal panacea for both public service and civil society failures 
across the world (McLaughlin, Osborne, and Ferlie 2002:11, McCourt in Ibid., 
Chapter 14) 
 
 Implicit or explicit pressure to conform to new ways of thinking, or at least of its 
expressions, would seem to account for many uncharacteristically modern features of laws 
and regulations governing Indonesia‟s decentralization. NPM-speak is found in such diverse 
sources as Law 22/1999‟s separation of political decision-making from public management 
organizations and the reconstruction plan for Aceh (R3WANS, Buku Utama, 26 March  
2005), whose goal description strikes a common cord with the tenants of NPM. Such thinking 
has even found its way into the circles of Ekonomi Rakyat (Peoples Economy) associated 
with Art 33 of the Indonesian constitution, especially in summing up differences between it 
and traditional administration (Mardiasmo 2002).  
 
Table 2. Comparison between traditional administration and NPM 
 
 
Traditional 
 
 
New Public Management 
 Centralistic 
 orientated to input 
 not bound to long-range 
planning 
 line-term & incremental 
 rigid departments 
 vote accounting 
 gross budget principle 
 yearly 
 decentralization and devolved management 
 orientated to input, output, outcome (value for money) 
 integrated & comprehensive in long-range planning 
 
 based upon goals and targets of work 
 cross departments 
 zero-base budgeting, planning program, budget system 
 systematic and rational 
 bottom-up budgeting 
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The fact that the new administrative thinking is seen as furthering a „peoples economy‟ based 
upon Java‟s collectivism concepts, or even the Supomo/Sukarno integralistic ones is striking. 
This is particularly so as the latter two are considered as being diametrically opposed to free-
flight capitalism from which New Public Management thinking originated.  
 
 
Closing Notes: Does NPM work? 
 
 Yet before subscribing to the high aspirations and claims of NPM, one wants to know 
if it works at all and, if so, is it exportable. Here Sweden as a focus of comparison is useful. 
Following New Zealand, England, the USA, and to some extent Holland, Sweden is one of 
the countries where NPM has been put into practice.  
 
 There are a number of NPM success stories in Sweden which might provide models 
for Indonesia. One of the more successful has been privatization of refuse collection at the 
kommun level, one more or less equivalent to the kebupaten. Given the staggering problems 
and even tragic results of refuse collection in Jakarta (Bekasi) and Bandung (Leuwigajah), the 
example is more relevant than might at first glance appear. In the Swedish case success has 
come about from the decentralized unit, the kommun, participating in establishing private 
companies and joint ventures with the private sector. Service for the public has been tackled 
within the broadest interpretations, namely service for the stake holders. They are not only 
producers of an impressive amount of refuse every year but also consumers of re-cycled 
products as paper, soil, packaging materials, sanitary (land) fill, energy and heat from 
burning, as well as the ultimate consumers of a cleaner environment leading to higher life 
quality. Through local taxes or private investments the citizen is ultimately the owner of 
instruments of refuse processing. In this respect citizens have the possibility to actively 
engage in almost the entire process. At least in this example, to which could be added others 
in the fields of security, telecommunications, telephones, and arguably electricity provision, 
core NPM concepts have brought about better services for less money. 
 
 The objection could be raised that the case of refuse disposal is actually the product of 
an artificial situation. It is profitable only because of the comprehensive environmental laws 
passed on the insistence of the „Greens‟ working hand in glove with the then ruling coalition 
with the Social Democratic Party. Laws and regulations carry monetary penalties and in 
extreme cases jail sentences for those responsible for transgressing them. They are monitored 
and enforced by the judiciary and even apply to those responsible within state-owned 
companies and subsidiaries. While it must be conceded that the profitability of recycling 
refuse comes in part from saving the costs of penalties for not doing so, the objection is only 
partially valid. On the positive side are good-will, in addition to purely economic and 
business aspects. Moreover, society always imposes conditions for public service. Hence the 
existence of costs and conditions does not per se detract from administrative improvements 
taken in response. On the contrary, the fact that kommun and private interests, selected by 
open competition via tender, could come up with an effective solution to new demands shows 
the potential gains of these administrative concepts. The ultimate goal is effect, namely to 
improve quality of life by introducing better methods and higher results at lower costs. 
 
 More ambivalent experiences of the Swedish daerah with fulfilling primary 
obligations exist in the field of health and education.  For those using primary health services 
which are now provided by both public institutions and private clinics, 
privatization/decentralization has been a great step forward to better services. Choice between 
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various units, which can in some ways be seen as competing with one another, has improved 
accessibility to primary medical care. The problem arises in connection with specialized 
treatment which can be provided only by large units with considerable technical capacity. 
Due to among other things high start-up costs, such units are limited to landsting-run 
hospitals with a few private ones whose future is at issue. Similar limitations apply to 
emergency treatment, especially when private clinics are closed outside of office hours and 
during holidays. In these cases the citizen/client is most often confronted by unacceptably 
long ques in public-run institutions. These vary greatly from place to place and from type of 
treatment. For example most breast cancer cases can be diagnosed and treated, even by 
operation, within weeks; in other cases people have been known to die of cancer while 
awaiting their turn for radiation treatment. Even predictable events as child-birth during the 
holiday months are problematic due to lack of personnel. Bottlenecks arise not in 
decentralization and/or privatization itself, which has produced better service where 
applicable, but in the half-done manner in which it has been carried out. 
 
 The situation finds a parallel in secondary education. Satisfied clients/customers/ 
citizens are those whose children profit from the new, so-called „free-schools‟. „Free-schools‟ 
are those founded outside the public sphere run by private organizations or foundations, but 
whose source of finances come from the state on the basis of number of students. In contrast 
to the secular, politically or socially neutral schools in the public domain, the „free-schools‟ 
are a mixed bag. The most numerous have a business basis, others religious orientations, i.e. 
fundamental Christian, Islamic, and still others what can be seen as a form of employees‟ 
cooperatives. The NPM character comes from their activities. They could be formed through 
the former government‟s opening the educational field to private investment. Schools which 
could offer popular programs could attract a large number of students. As the state paid out a 
set sum per student, the emphasis became more quantity than quality. Hence a number of 
educational programs were started that had high interest for young people, leading to an 
attractive market. At the same time the state not longer controlled that these schools had the 
necessary facilities or even qualified teachers. The result was that more students could 
receive education, which was attractive for the State budget. At the same time the public 
schools which tended to concentrate on theoretical-academic circle. This is both out of 
tradition, i.e. preparation for attendance in the realm‟s universities and institutions of higher 
learning and out of costs as theoretical-academic circle are cheaper. Learning is led by a 
single teacher using approved text-books and class room techniques.  
 
 The results have been ambivalent. Serious institutions, usually already formed schools 
benefited, as did their students and graduates. However, all-too-many of the „free schools‟ 
provided their students with under-quality instruction or with a curriculum unattractive, if not 
useless on the employment market. The present government has tightened up requirements 
for the „free-schools‟ to the extent it is questionable if most will continue to be lucrative for 
their owners. English interest copying in the Swedish model in this respect maybe premature, 
if no counterproductive. Yet the most important result of the movement lies in precisely the 
NPM spirit. The competition of these schools have stimulated the public schools to see over 
their circulum in order to tailor programs more closely to the interests and ambitions of those 
reading the courses. This is, of course, within the bounds of quality education with full 
facilities as libraries, resource teachers (for handicapped and those with insufficient 
background studies. The point is that while while many „free-school‟ were merely a front to 
make profits in the best entreprenal spirit (which they did/do), the net result of the 
competition will be to strengthen and modernize educational programs.    
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Computerization/HP 
 
  More detailed discussion of possibilities for reform can be read in almost any 
publication on revising the administration be they at the national, regional, or local level. 
Literature by Indonesian authorities is not exceptional. Of the many which could be named 
one which seems to offer particular advantages to Indonesia is the whole realm of 
computerization of the administration. That is one can possibly increase administrative 
effectiveness while at the same time reducing corruption via electronic means. With new 
techniques of the internet, both via computers and cell phones one can connect customers/end 
users directly with administrative services. These fall into roughly two categories: 
 
Information 
 Though data-bases available on the internet, end users, i.e. customers can receive 
direct and full information on rules, regulations, possibilities, and restrictions. This should be 
a free public service function as the existing governmental home pages, news, weather 
reports, market prices by private companies or public service communication, etc. By 
expanding such neutral and free services one cuts out one set of middle-men whose regulation 
of information is a source of income. In the best of cases the customer/end user would no 
longer have to pay for information („information is gold‟). They are then better able to utilize 
the possibilities and make more realistic decisions. 
Pay by internet 
 Paying via the internet is already pretty well developed in the West, but only slowly 
catching on in Asia. The basic idea is that public authorities via computers bill directly 
customers and users of their services. These in turn pay their bills directly to a computer-bank 
via the internet. The problem to date that one must have an internet bank account or a valid 
credit card, both of which are rare in Asia, would seem to be a temporary one. Indonesia, like 
India, has a very high density of mobile telephones but low density of computers. Many of the 
latest developments here are aimed at putting this to use by finding ways of transferring funds 
via mobile telephones-cum-computers as the latest developments. Several social networks and 
game programs already have ways of giving the customer or winner credits. Many software 
developers believe that a way can be found to make payments over the mobile telephones. If 
so, or more realistically, when this happens then for at least certain payment to authorities, i.e. 
taxes, licenses, permits, automobile registration, etc. can be done electronically. This again 
cuts out the need for bribes usual for every transaction (note: new e-phones, etc.). Moreover 
the costs of setting up the program would of necessity have to be done by the public 
authorities on their own budget. Although seemingly daunting in the start-up phase, it in the 
long term a minor problem. The gains for the state in efficiency of information distributed and 
income received via impersonal payment would in a very short time pay back the costs of the 
set up. Although the author has lifted from the almost unlimited inventiveness of Indonesian 
corruptors, so far none have been able to trick the computers. 
 
  Just to show how far the internet can lead imaginative developments, one can cite the 
very popular cite „Ipaidabribe.com‟ from Bangalore, Karanata. Here ordinary citizens can 
register in some detail, but anonymously, the bribes they were forced to pay to obtain services 
the state government is supposed to supply for free. 
 The impact of the idea comes from another Indian reaction to what is seen as 
overproduction of corruption by public authorities, which by any standards is mega-
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corruption (Indonesia pretty much a small time player, at least since the days of President 
Suharto). Not long ago the idea was launched to differentiate between demanding/taking a 
bribe for „free‟ public services and paying one. It was argued that the former is clearly illegal 
action on the part of public servants, i.e. corruption and a hindrance to public service; the 
latter is only a survival technique born of necessity to get the services in question. It was 
further pointed out that by forcing citizens to pay a bribe for services, the official in question 
brings them into the illegal sphere of breaking the law, in the Common Law system an even 
more criminal act by conspiring with the public official to break the law which carries a 
greater punishment. Thus corruption in the providing of public services is doubly criminal. 
The solution is to de-criminalize the paying of a bribe as a necessity in a culture of corruption, 
but retain or increase the penalties for demanding and/or taking one. The idea or differential 
status before the law is not without its followers as a means of curbing what is seen as 
unsocial behavior. For example, in Sweden it is illegal to pay for sexual services, but not be 
paid, the rational is that the „customer‟ directly contributes to the spread of the trade. 
Similarly in the Indian case why should the victim of corruption be forced into compliance 
with illegal demands, which also has the effect of undermining any thought of reporting 
corruption to the appropriate authorities as one has in the process become guilt of conspiracy 
to cheat the state.  
 
 Not unexpectedly the suggestion met with enormous protest, especially among the 
public officials. This was, of course, not argued on the grounds of protecting the corruptors, 
but suddenly defense of law and order. By making legal the paying of bribes, even for public 
services, so the argument ran, one was encouraging lawlessness and immorality, as if mega-
corruption was not. Whatever the merits or lack of such of the concept, it does raise the 
difficult issue to choices by society. Does the decriminalization of paying a bribe undermine 
law and order more than the apparent hopelessness in the face of massive and institutionalized 
demands for bribes to receive the services citizens have a right to? 
 
Accountability to political to public 
 
 At risk of anticipating tomorrow‟s session on political decentralization, it seems clear 
that the bottom line in decentralization-administrative reform is public opinion. Again one can 
learn from the Indian case. There mass protests have erupted from the revealing of public 
corruption. Not only demonstration, but fasts by influential religious leaders as Babu 
…and….attest to an outraged public aversion to the shenanigans of its public servants. Where 
is Indonesian public reaction?  Demonstrations and worse are common vis a vis religious 
thought seen as deviant or even controversy over a patient criticizing hospital services. But 
where is an engaged and demanding public in face of institutionalized corruption? Here one 
should again emphasize that it is the corruption that hinders citizens in carrying out their daily 
lives or the government in fulfilling its responsibilities that are in focus. The history of 
countries which have cleaned up corruption, the U.S. and Sweden, both of which would have 
been on the bottom of TI corruption/transparency index in the late nineteenth century, show 
that it is the political will backed by public opinion that are crucial.  
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